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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Utah,
Defendant \and Respondent,
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Intervenor and Respondent.

Case No.
7639

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Section 80-5-1 of the Utah Code as amended provides
that:
"•* • • all taxable property must be assessed
at 40% of its reasonable, fair cash value. Land
and the improvements thereon must be separately
assessed."
'Section 80-3-1(5) provides:
" 'Value' and 'full cash value' mean the
amount at which the property would be taken
in payment of a just debt due from a solvent
debtor."
1
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This appeal involves the question of whether these
words mean what they seem to appellant clearly to say;
or if they are to be so construed that the taxing authorities can arbitrarily assign any figure as the value of
specific property for tax purposes within the range
from market value to an "astronomical figure" based
upon the particular owner's earnings and his need for
and use of that specific property in connection with his
business operations.
I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Two tracts of real property—both exclusive of any
surface improvements and mineral content—are here
involved: the Kennecott tailings pond, and its millsite
lands in Salt Lake County, Utah. The following facts
are quoted from the stipulated findings (R. 2-10):
"4(a). Plaintiff's mining operation in the
State of Utah is a vast and continuous operation
beginning with what is commonly known as the
Utah Copper Mine, one of the largest open-pit
mines in the world. The ore is low grade, and
large scale operations are essential to the profitable mining thereof. The pit is terraced with
benches or levels varying in elevation from 50
to 85 feet and in width from 65 to 300 feet, with
a perimeter of approximately 5 miles and a
maximum depth of approximately 1800 feet.
" (b) The pit is reached by standard gauge
railroad on the surface and by tunnel; the area of
operations in Bingham Canyon is nearly 3000
acres, which includes the open pit and about 150
miles of standard gauge railroad tracks therein
2
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and in surface and subterranean connections between the pit and the reduction works owned by
plaintiff at Magna and Arthur, Utah, about 13
miles distant. Plaintiff is the owner of more than
25,000 acres of land in Bingham Canyon and at
and in the vicinity of the reduction works at
Arthur and Magna.
"5(a) The crude ores as mined by plaintiff
and hauled from the mine at Bingham to mills at
Magna and Arthur for concentration, contain a
great quantity of waste material. In the course of
the concentration process, less than three per cent
by weight of the crude ores mined is removed in
the form of concentrates. The concentrates contain the values and are saved, smelted and refined
and thus converted into a commercial product.
One ton of concentrates is obtained from thirtysix tons of crude ores, and the remaining thirtyfive tons, being the refuse material or tailings, are
flowed out over and deposited in a tailings dump.
" (b)In the course of the concentration of the
crude ores from plaintiff's said mine and the ores
mined therefrom by plaintiff's predecessors in
interest, the discarded refuse material has been
deposited year after year over the period of approximately forty-one years last past, in the
vicinity of plaintiff's Magna and Arthur concentrating mills in said dump of tailings over an
area of 6258.93 acres more particularly described
in the complaint and in evidence before the court.
"(c) The tailings for one year have been
placed on the tailings of previous years, creating
a dump at present of approximately 481,000,000
tons of tailings spread over this area of 6258.93
acres at an average depth of 36 feet. The tailings
are of fine content, require constant treatment to
prevent dust storms, and will not support or sustain any growth. Before use as a tailings dump
8
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this area was swampy pasture land used for grazing and pasturing and similar to land presently
surrounding and adjacent to the dump area. The
dump area has now lost all value for such uses,
which have been destroyed.
" ( d ) The crude ores have varied somewhat
in their copper content, but over the past twentyfive years the average copper contained therein
has been approximately one per cent of their
weight, In the course of the concentration or reduction process in the mills at Magna and Arthur
over the past fifteen years the average percentage
of recovery has been approximately ninety per
cent. Thus the tailings contain approximately
one-tenth of one per cent copper. These tailings
are a permanent deposit upon this area, which has
become and long has been a tailings dump and
nothing else. Under any present methods the tailings will never be worth removing and will never
be removed.
" ( e ) These tailings are worthless except in
this, that over the past several years plaintiff has
recovered from the water draining from the tailings dump, copper in the form of copper precipitates and thus the small quantity of copper remaining in the tailings after the reduction process
has been completed is being slowly drained out
of the tailings dump. In the year 1939—179,543
pounds of copper was obtained from this source;
in the year 1940—1,224,567 pounds; in the year
1941—595,575 pounds; in the year 1942—412,241
pounds; in the year 1943—478,390 pounds; in the
year 1944—741,925 pounds; in the year 1945—348,254 pounds; and in the year 1946—148,101 pounds ;
and the year 1947—401,073 pounds of popper were
so produced. As is and has been well known, and
understood by the taxing authorities of the State
of Utah, the copper so recovered has been included
4
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in the total production figures annually reported
to the State Tax Commission by this taxpayer,
is reflected in net 'proceeds for the purpose of the
mine assessment at two times their value, and as
well in the gross proceeds of the mine upon which
the mining occupation tax is and has been assessed
each year.
" ( f ) In order to retain the 481,000,000 tons
of mine tailings in the 6258.93 acre dump, plaintiff
and its predecessors have been required over the
many years to expend hundreds of thousands of
dollars to construct the dike which is in place on
the outside perimeter thereof. The total so expended far exceeds the tax values of said dump as
assessed by defendant to which objection is made
by plaintiff. This dike generally tapers from
about an 85-foot base to a 20-foot top1, and is composed of rock, gravel and solid earth in contrast
to the fine tailings. In the initial stages of the
deposit of the mine tailings on the old lake lands,
no such dike was required. The necessity for the
dike came into existence as additional tailings
were piled upon tailings first deposited upon the
swamp land. This process has continued until
the average depth of the dike and tailings at the
time of the assessment was about 36 feet.
" ( g ) Plaintiff must continue to enlarge the
dike from time to time at a cost of further thousands of dollars per year in order to continue to
contain the mine tailings, as additional tailings
are continually added to the top of the dump. Except for any unused portion, i.e., remaining capacity for additional tailings, the dike serves no
purpose except to retain and prevent the tailings
already deposited on the dump from flowing down
and away from the dump, and thus trespassing
upon other adjacent real property.
"(h)

The dump requires continuous, con0
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stant attention, care and expense in order to avoid
becoming a nuisance. The tailings must be kept
moist. Litigation involving some three hundred
plaintiffs and a damage claim of three million
dollars has heretofore involved plaintiff with respect to this dump. During 1950 apipiroximately
$200,000.00 will be spent in connection with this
dump in caring for current mine tailings and preventing creation of a nuisance.
" (i) Gradually the dump is approaching the
maximum depth (or height) to which tailings can
be retained by the existing dikes, which will involve two problems: (1) assuming continuation
of mining operations by plaintiff, the acquisition
of additional dump sites by purchase or condemnation or construction of other dikes upon the existing tailings; and (2) the ultimate capping of
the present dump with rock and material similar
to the dike at a presently estimated cost of $5000.00 per acre in order to prevent surface blowing
of the tailings by wind onto the property of others.
"6. Plaintiff's mills at Arthur and Magna
are situated upon tracts comprising a total of 982.42 acres of land owned by plaintiff and more particularly described in the complaint and in the
evidence before the court. These lands are assessed separately from any improvements or personal property thereon; they are not located upon
patented mining claims or locations and are situated geographically against the base of a mountain sloping down to the north where the refuse
in the form of tailings dump is deposited on part
of the bottom lands of old Lake Bonneville. These
lands are situated so that they are particularly
adaptable to a gravity process of reducing ores,
are easily accessible to the American Smelting &
Refining Gfurfield smelter where the concentrates
produced at the Company's mills may be further
6
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reduced by smelting, and are easily accessible to
to the railroads where the smelted products may
be received and shipped to the refineries for the
final reduction process to a marketable product.
Lands similar to the millsite lands and adjacent
thereto can be used for grazing and other purposes since, as distinguished from the tailings
dump area, the original characteristics of the millsite lands and their potential uses have not been
destroyed.
" 7 ( a ) . Prior to the year 1919 said lands
were assessed by the county assessor of Salt Lake
County. Commencing with that year and continuing to date said lands were assessed by the
taxing authorities of the State of Utah, i.e., the
State Board of Equalization for the years 1919
to 1930, inclusive, and since that time by the State
Tax Commission under the provisions of 80-5-56,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended. Said
lands were assessed as real estate, and in addition
there was assessed machinery and property of
plaintiff and the surface use made of mining
claims or mining property other than for mining
purposes, and the assessed valuation based on net
annual proceeds of the mine pursuant to Section
80-5-56 et seq.
'' (b) The assessment of plaintiff's mine was
protested for the years 1917 and 1918 and resulted
in litigation which terminated with the decision of
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals November 12,1923, Salt Lake County v. Utah Copper
Company, 294 Fed. 199.
" ( c ) The assessment in particular with respect to the tailings dump millsites and recreation
area was protested in 1942 and each year thereafter, the protests for the years 1947 and 1948
resulting in the present case, and that for the year
1944 resulting in the case of Salt Lake County

7
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v. Kennecott Copper Corporation, decided by the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals April 14,
1947,163 Fed. (2d) 484.
" (d) By stipulation in the course of trial the
matter of the recreation area has been eliminated
from this case, together with other issues accordingly not covered by these findings of fact.
"(e) The lands in question, namely, the
tailings dump and millsites, have never been reported by plaintiff to the State Tax Commission
as a 'mine or mining claim' or as patented mining
ground. These lands have however, always been
reported by plaintiff and its predecessors in interest as a 'part of its mine' to be assessed at the
statutory rate of $5.00 per acre, which requested
assessment has always been denied by the Tax
Commission.
"(f) The only instance which has come to
the attention of the Commission wherein a dump
is located on other than a mining claim, patented
or unpatented, is the Kennecott Copper Dump as
outlined on Exhibit A. All other dumps being located on a mining claim, patented or unpatented,
have been assessed at $5.00 per acre. Plaintiff's
Utah Copper Mine is by far the largest physically
in Utah, but its mines and dumps differ in no
respect except in relative size and the further fact
that this dump is not located on a mining claim,
patented or unpatented. This last factor is one of
the criteria which the Commission claims is and
should be considered in assessing these mining
dumps either at $5.00 per acre under Section 805-56, or at 40 per cent of its reasonable fair cash
value.
"8(a). The values for which plaintiff's tailings dump and millsites were assessed for 1947
and prior years, the location of these lands with
respect to adjacent lands, and the amounts for
8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which said lands were assessed, are shown in
Exhibit A herein and by reference made a part
of these findings. Lands adjacent to and physically the same as the mill-site lands were assessed
at $5.44 and $6.86 per acre. Lands adjacent to the
tailings dump and physically the same as the
dump land prior to its conversion to and use as
such dump were assessed at figures ranging from
$4.14 to $20.27 per acre with the exception of one
632-acre tract of the Morton Salt Company assessed at $66.16 per acre. This tract is used by owner
for impounding thereon the salt brine removed
from Great Salt Lake. The salt in the various
stages of harvest in the owner's several salt
ponds is separately assessed. The tract on which
the salt plant is situated is assessed at $10.67 per
acre.
"(b) The rate of assessment per acre of the
plaintiff's tailings dump and millsite lands applied for 1947 and 1948 has been the same since
1919, except for two reductions in value along in
1932 or 1933 at which time there were some general reductions made in real estate values. Several
changes in total acreage have occurred during this
period which have been reflected in changes accordingly in the total assessment. Since the protests of the plaintiff in 1942 and thereafter the
Commission has given consideration to the assessment of the property herein involved and has
determined that the said figure of $45.73 is
reasonable, fair and proper.
"9. The taxes which plaintiff paid under
protest to defendant and for which recovery is
herein sought are $12,163.97 for 1947 on the tailings dump and $1909.27 on the millsites, less
$1538.80 tendered by plaintiff for 1947 based
upon a valuation of $5.00 per acre; and $13,169.00
for 1948 less the same sum.''
9
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II.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
INVOLVED
a. Section 11, Article XIII of the Utah Constitution provides that the State Tax Commission shall assess
mines for purposes of taxation. Section 80-5-3 of the Utah
Code Annotated 1943 accordingly provides that the State
Tax Commission must assess "all mines and mining
claims, and the value of metalliferous mines" based on
a multiple of the annual net proceeds as provided in
subsequent sections, together with "all machinery used
in mining and all property or surface improvements
upon or appurtenant to mines and mining claims and the
value of any surface use made of nonmetalliferous mining claims or mining property for other than mining
purposes; all tangible property not required by the Constitution or by law to be assessed by the state tax commission must be assessed by the county assessor of the
several counties in which the same is situated. For the
purposes of taxation all mills, reduction works and
smelters used exclusively for the purpose of reducing
or smelting the ores from a mine or mining claim by the
owner thereof shall be deemed to be appurtenant to such
mine or mining claim though the same is not upon such
mine or mining claim."
b. By Section 80-5-55 the 'State Tax Commission is
required each year to prepare a mine assessment book
in which is to be entered "the assessment of all mines
in the state subject to assessment by it and in which book
must be specified in separate columns and under appropriate heads:
"(1) Owner of mine.
10
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"(2)
mine.
'' (3)
"(4)
mine.

Name and description and location of the
County in whMi it is situated.
Net proceeds in dollars, if a metalliferous

" (5) Number of tons of ore mined whether by the
owner, lessee, contractor or otherwise.
"(6) Amount received for ore and metal if sold;
if not sold the value thereof.
"(7)

Value of mine.

" (8)

Value of the machinery,

"(9) Value of supplies and other personal property.
'' (10) Value of improvements.
"(11) Value of machinery, property and surface
improvements having a value 'separate and independent
of all such mines or mining claims assessed by the state
tax commission, and the names of the owners of the
same.'y
c. Section 80-5-32 provides that the county assessor
shall furnish to the State Tax Commission a complete list
and description "of all machinery used in mining, and
all property and surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines and mining claims, which have a value separate and independent of all such mines or mining claims,
owned by the owner of such mines or mining claims, situated in his jcounty, and note thereon the value of such
property."
11
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d. Section 80-5-46(5) requires the Tax Commission
to prepare and maintain from year to year a complete
record of " a l l machinery used in mining and all property
or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines
or mining claims;" while Section 80-5-59 requires every
person engaged in mining to make and file with the
State Tax Commission a statement "showing the gross
annual proceeds from each mine or mining claim and the
production thereof in fine ounces of gold and silver and
other precious metals, and in pounds of lead, copper and
other semiprecious and base metals, and the deductions
provided for Section 80-5-57, together with a statement
showing all the machinery used in mining and all property and surface improvements upon or appurtenant to
each mine or mining claim owned or worked by such
person during the year preceding, and the value of the
same at 12 o'clock m. on the 1st day of J a n u a r y next preceding, * * * "
/. Section 80-5-56 provides that " a l l metalliferous
mines and mining claims, both placer and rock in place,
shall be assessed at $5 per acre and in addition thereto
at a value equal to two time the net annual proceeds
thereof for the calendar year next preceding;" while by
the following section it is provided t h a t : " T h e words,
'net annual proceeds,' of a metalliferous mine or mining
claim are defined to be the gross proceeds realized during
the preceding calendar year from the sale or conversion
into money or its equivalent of all ores from such mine or
mining claims extracted by the owner or lessee, contractor or other person working upon or operating the property, including all dumps and tailings, during or previous
12
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to the year for which the assessment is made, * * *"
less certain deductions only therein enumerated.
g. Section 80-5-1 as amended in 1947 by Chapter 102
of the Session Laws for that year provides that "all
taxable property must be assessed at 40% of its reasonable, fair cash value. Land and the improvements thereon must be separately assessed;" while Section 80-3-1(5)
provides " i Value' and 'full cash value' mean the amount
at which the property would be taken in payment of a
just debt due from a solvent debtor.''
h. Finally, 'Sections 2 and 24 of Article I of the
Constitution of Utah and Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
guarantee equal protection and uniformity in the administration of laws; Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibit
the taking of plainiff's property without due process of
law; and Section 2 of Article XIII of the Utah Constitution provides that all tangible property in the State of
Utah shall be taxed in proportion to its value, while the
following Section 3 of the same Article provides that the
legislature "shall provide by law a uniform and eqtual
rate of assessment and taxation on all tangible property
in the State, according to its value in money, and shall
prescribe by law such regulations as shall secure a just
valuation for taxation of such property, so that every
person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to
the value of his, her, or its tangible property * * *".

IS
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III.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1.
The District Court erred in failing to hold that the
assessment was void because made in an arbitrary and
discriminatory manner contrary to mandates for uniformity and equal protection.
2.
The District Court erred in failing to hold that the
assessment was void because it violated the mandate that
the valuation of these lands should be based upon the
"amount at which the property would be taken in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor.''
3.
The District Court erred in holding that the lands
in question, particularly the tailings dump lands, were
not a part of plaintiff's mine to which the statutory flat
rate of $5.00 per acre should apply.
IV.
ARGUMENT
1.
The District Court erred in failing to hold that the
assessment was void because made in an arbitrary and
discriminatory manner contrary to mandates for uniformity
and equal protection.
The record is clear that Kenneeott alone of all the
hundreds of mines in Utah has been singled out for
"special attention." (R. 50) True, as the court suggested,
the result may be that the tax treatment of the Kenneeott
dump lands and millsite lands is correct and that the
14
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Commission is only in error with respect to its treatment of all other mine owners. Nevertheless, until the
Commission indicates a willingness to correct all such
other assessments, the result is arbitrary and discriminatory and justifies action by the court to void such an
assessment.
As was said by the United States Supreme Court in
the famous case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 30
Led. 220:
" Though the law itself be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make
unjust and illegal discriminations between persons
in similar circumstances, material to their rights,
the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.''
Such a result would require action just as Utah's
Supreme Court has said should be taken where the
" property of one person, or a class of 'persons, or a particular class of property, is intentionally assessed at a
a valuation greater in proportion to its real or cash value
than is placed on the general mass of other taxable propter ty * * •*. Denial of such right results in inequality and
a want of uniformity in the assessment and taxation."
First National Bank of Nephi v. Christensen, 39 Utah 568,
118 P. 778,
Here, as shown by Exhibit A, like property owned
by others adjacent to the millsite lands is assessed at
$6.86 and $5.44 per acre, and adjacent to the tailings
pond at $4.14, $8.67, $8.73, $8.75, $6.75, $66.16, $10.67,
$10.54, $4.85, $7.28, $7.33, $7.31 (four tracts), $10.06,
15
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$6.60, $5.19, $8.75, $10.91, $18.88, $7.50, $10.92, $11.31,
$13.08, $13.06, and $2.2.89 (R, 12).
But when the Tax Commission undertook to apply
the same prescribed measure of valuation to the Kennecott lands, it brought forth the figure of $45.73 per
acre. No one knows the origin of this particular figure,
which is 40% of $114A0 per ucre, but when Kennecott
protested Commissioner Hammond testified that the
Commission considered the protest and was of the
opinion this assessment was fair. (R. 95)
These mine assessments were, it should be noted,
made by the Commission as a rule on the basis of an
" e v a l u a t i o n " by the witness Higgs. (R. 23) When
plaintiff attempted to go beyond the "crystal b a l l " fiat
of the Commission and to seek out the standards used
by its evaluator in the case of Kennecott, Higgs said that
he didn't know where the $45.73 figure came from except
that it was not his own personal evaluation of the property on the basis of its value. (R. 56) He testified that
he had reported the Kennecott lands to the Commission
as p a r t of plaintiff's mine and considered the tailings
pond and the mills as a unit in the entire mining operation (R. 57); but that the Commission had instructed
him to continue the use of the $45.73 figure (R. 55) ;
although he knew of no other single instance among the
hundreds of Utah mines which he had evaluated and
with which he was familiar where such assessment was
made at other than as p a r t of the mine at the flat $5.00
p!er acre figure (R. 59). I n Kennecott's case he used
the figures given him by the Commission—he didn't
evaluate. (R. 53)
16
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Further, this magic figure of unknown origin was
used by the Commission in disregard of the statutory
mandates which until 1948 required use of full cash
value, when by action of the 1947 legislature a reduction
was made to 40% thereof. (R. 56) Finally, Mr. James
W. Collins, whose reputation is well known, testified that
the market value of the dump land was nominal (R. 74)
and of the millsite lands $10.00 to $20.00 per acre. (R.
77)
By its actions it seems plain that the defendant
Commission told Kennecott that regardless of constitution, statute or protests, it must accept this arbitrary
and discriminatory assessment; and its counsel has
frankly argued below the Commission's -contention that
the courts are powerless to effect a remedy.

2.

The District Court erred in failing to hold that the
assessment was void because it violated the mandate that
the valuation of these lands should be based upon the
"amount at which the property would be taken in payment
of a just debt due from a solvent debtor."
It seems clear to plaintiff that the Commission has
departed from the statutory standards in determining
what is value for tax purposes. Section 80-3-1(5), in
qualifying Section 80-5-1, clearly indicates that, as admitted by counsel for the Tax Commission, market value is
the test. Again we repeat that the test is the "amount
at which the property would be taken in payment of a
just debt due from a solvent debtor."
17
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It is not the asset value or book value, but the
market value which might be more or less. Continental
National Bank of Salt Lake City v. Naylor, 54 Utah 49,
63; 179 P. 67. There the taxing authorities attempted
to go behind market value to determine the asset value
of bank stock. It excludes such intangibles as good will.
Section 80-3-1(1); Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Salt Lake
County, 64 Utah 491, 210 P. 106.
"Actual value has been defined as the value
of property in the market in the ordinary course
of trade. This standard of values prescribed by
statute cannot be varied by public officers or by
agreement of parties." 51 Am. Jur. 649.
Plaintiff of course appreciates, as is further stated
by all standard works, that:
"All of the various elements which enter
into the value of property are to be considered
by the assessors in making valuations for tax
purposes, and all that can be required is that
the assessors exercise an honest judgment, based
upon the information they possess or are able to
acquire. In valuing tangible property, elements
to be considered include the advantages of the
situation of the property, its earning capacity
or productiveness, the purpose or use to which
it is put, its actual earnings, and any other factors
which may influence or enhance its actual value.''
51 Am. Jur. Taxation, Sec. 697, Valuation-Elements.
The opinion of Mr. Collins specifically included all
of the foregoing elements, and reached the result that
the tailings dump was of nominal value and the millsite
lands of a maximum value of $10.00 to $20.00. (B. 74,
77)
18
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We quote from Mr. Collins' testimony with respect
to the dump lands (R. 75):
A. I would consider any value put on it as
simply an arbitrary value; it has no basic
value for the ground; if I have answered your
question correctly.
Q. Now, if the value is to be measured by the
use of the land to Kennecott itself, is it your
opinion that the figure of $45.73 has any relationship to that value?
A. I would think not because it is useless land.
I would have no idea as to the value of the
tailings. That isn't covered in your question.
Q. That's right,
A. I have no idea of the value of the tailings;
only speak of the values of the land. The
value of the land was destroyed when these
tailings were put upon them.
Q. Measured by the value of the use to Kennecott, the figure might just as well have
been $450 per acre or $4,500 per acre, is that
correct?
A. It would be just some arbitrary value.
Q. Or $10 per acre?
A. That's correct,
Q. Mr. Collins, in assessing values for ta^: purposes, it is perfectly proper, is it not, to
include in the elements of value such items
as location and use to which the land may be
put, and possible income therefrom, and similar factors, is it not ?
A. That's correct.
Q. And you have had those in mind in expressing
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your opinions in questions I have asked you?
A. I have.
With respect to the millsite lands he testified (R.
Q. Assuming these facts, have these mill-site
lands, or any part thereof, any reasonable
fair cash value in the sense that this land, or
any part thereof, would be taken in payment
of a just debt due from a solvent debtor, and,
of course, assume their availability for sale
or disposition.
A. They would have a nominal value.
Q. Would you care to express an opinion of the
limits which such land lands might have with
respect to value, as contra-distinguished from
the tailings dump lands where you said there
was no value, or a nominal value?
A. Say from ten to twenty dollars an acre.
Q. Can you conceive of other uses to which
these, or similar lands, can be put, if they
were disposed of and not used by Kennecott?
A, For partly grazing purposes, not farming
because the contour of the land is not available for anything excepting that purpose,
excepting the use it is now put to.
Q. Then, in your opinion, and using as—assuming as the basis of the assessment for tax
purposes to be forty per cent of the reasonable fair cash value of these mill-site lands,
in the sense that these lands, or any part
thereof, would be taken in payment of a just
debt due from a solvent debtor, would the
ad valorem tax assessment at the rate of
$45.73 per acre be within the permissible
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limits of the exercise of judgment by tax
authorities?
A. I would consider them to be greatly excessive.
Q. Would you say that would be so to the extent
of the assessment being arbitrary?
A. I would say it was an arbitrary assessment,
yes, sir.
Q. Now, assuming that we use, as a basis of
the value, the value of those lands to Kennecott itself for its existing and current purposes, can you express an opinion as to what
that value might be?
A. I 'm sure I could not.
Q. Might it just as well be $475 per acre or
$4,075 per acre?
A. It could be; it would be some arbitrary figure.
Q. Measured by the nuisance value, I presume,
of Kennecott finding some other lands, would
it not?
A. That is correct.
Q. And the expense of acquiring those lands
and moving all the mills ?
A. That is correct.
Mr. Hammond of the Tax Commission does not dispute this result. His difference arises on the question of
whether or not there may also be injected into the picture the special value of these lands in KennecotVs specific operation (R. 82); and this is the issue on which
this point turns. It is admitted by all concerned that if
this element can be injected into the picture, the lid is
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off in that 40% of the amount at which the property
would be taken in payment of a just debt due from a
solvent debtor no longer applies. The upper limit is
" astronomical,'' and the figure used depends entirely
upon the "judgment" of the Commission. (K. 88) In
turn the figure used could be modified at any time by
whim, malice or any other factor within the conscious
or unconscious minds of the Commissioners, and with
no ready test to determine whether or not the result was
reasonable or arbitrary.
As was said in the case of Great Northern Eailroad
Co. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 80 L. ed. 532:
The full and true value of the property is
the amount that the owner would be entitled to
receive as just compensation upon a taking of
that property by the State or the United States
in the exertion of the power of eminent domain.
That value is the equivalent of the property, in
money paid at the time of the taking. Olson v.
United States, 292 U. S. 246, 254, 78 L. ed. 1236,
1243, 54 S. Ct. 704. The principles governing the
ascertainment of value for the purposes of taxation, are the same as those that control in condemnation cases, confiscation cases and generally
in controversies involving the ascertainment of
just compensation. West v. Chesapeake & P.
Teleph. Co. 295 U. S. 662, 79 L. ed. 1640, 1646,
55S.Ct.894.
Again, as was said in the case of Lebanon & Nashville Turnpike Co. v. Creveling (Tenn.), 17 S,W. (2d)
22:
A careful examination of the instructions
given by the learned trial judge satisfied us that
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he properly followed the well-established rule
announced repeatedly in this state, in accord with
text-book and decision authorities generally. See,
among others, 20 C.J. 727, 728; 10 R.C.L. 128;
Tennessee cases above cited; and authorities
quoted in Alloway v. Nashville, 88 Tenn. 510,
8 L.R.A. 123, 13 S.W. 123. We quote from the
charge the following excerpts:
" F o r the property actually taken he is entitled to a sum equal to its fair market value on
the day of the appropriation. In determining
such 'fair market value' you will assume that the
owner of the property on the date of the appropriation was willing to sell, but did not have to
do so, and that the taker desired to purchase that
particular kind and quantity of property, but,
like the owner, was under no particular constraint
to make the trade and transfer. That is to say,
you may assume that some reasonably prudent
man wanted such property as was owned by the
defendant and that in his survey of available
purchases came upon the property in question and
that the owner of such property, although he did
not have to sell, was willing to do so for a fair
price and full cash payment. Then what yon
believe the property would likely bring under
such circumstances is the figure you are justified
in putting down as your judgment of the property's 'fair market value.'
"The value of the property taken cannot be
enhanced by the owner's unwillingness to sell,
nor is the question to be considered the peculiar
value of the property to the oivner nor its value
to the party condemning it. The desire of the
defendant to keep and the need of the plaintiff
to buy are not such considerations as should
regulate your estimate of 'fair market value.' "
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Likewise the annotation in 124 A.L.R. 910 is replete
with illustrations that special values for adaptability
of property for the particular purpose taken, are not
to be included in the raeasure of value, instances being
those of property for reservoir and power plant sites,
do|cks, highways, schools, telephone and telegraph and
power line facilities, etc.
This is reflected in Utah law where in the case of
Tanner v. Canal and Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 108, our
Supreme Court said:
Counsel, however, urge that to permit respondent to use their canals as contemplated will
be of great advantage, and may result in considerable profit to him. This may be so, and yet
the question remains, In what way does what he is
permitted to do damage appellants? They are
limited in their recovery by the amount of damages suffered by them. They cannot recover for
any benefit respondent may receive. * * *
We fully recognize that the potential need for the
acquisition of adjacent lands as additions to the tailings
dump has increased greatly the value of those lands
through this possible use, and this is reflected in the
present valuations thereof. Where we differ is with the
Commission's contention that bejcause a lot is improved
by the addition thereon of a $100,000.00 building, the
value of the land as distinguished from the building
could be set for tax purposes at a point from its cost
to a maximum figure of $100,000.00 because this is the
value of the use of that land to the owner. We can see
that the improvement of the land by the addition thereto
of a $100,000.00 building may add to and enhance the
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value of the land on which it stands, as well as to the
value of adjacent lands. Or the building, if a tannery,
may well detract generally from land values of both
the tannery site and adjacent lands.
But the lands themselves do not directly partake
of the values of the improvements. Such enhancement
or diminution in land value resulting is reflected in
market values, or as Utah's statutes read, in the value
in money at which a creditor would accept the land in
payment of a debt due from a solvent debtor. By departing from this standard the Tax Commission insists upon
perpetuation of a wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and
capricious assessment, contrary to law.

3.

The District Court erred in holding that the lands in
question, particularly the tailings dump lands, were not a
part of plaintiff's mine to which the statutory flat rate of
$5.00 per acre should apply.
True, not until 1942 did plaintiff, concerned with
annual tax bills in the millions, protest to the Tax Commission that its relatively insignificant assessment of the
tailings dump and millsite lands was unjust. While
before the court below, the Commission finally confessed
to two protested failures to follow the statutes, it still
refused to admit either of the bases for complaint hereinbefore set forth; or Kennecott's third objection, which
would settle the other two: the legislative mandate to
the Commission is that metalliferous mines should be
assessed as a unit, with the land at a flat $5.00 per acre.
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This of course is in addition to improvements and appurtenances such as buildings and equipment, with the net
proceeds the essential ingredient for the ad valorem
assessment.
In addition to the "crystal ball" theory that the
Commission could evolve a "judgment" free from judicial or even legislative control, counsel for the Tax
Commission evolved two further defenses to answer this
third point, as well as the fact that it was giving Kennecott "special treatment" among all the hundreds of
Utah mines with their mills and dumps in each case
an essential integrated part of each mine.
The first defense was that Kennecott had failed to
protest. This rapidly blew up, since for years Kennecott
and its predecessors have reported the mills and dump
lands as a part of its mine to which the statutory flat
rate of $5.00 per acre should apply. (R. 60, 108). Incidentally, this rate—let alone 100% thereof—is a liberal
figure in the State's favor, for rarely if ever is mining
land worth more for any purpose other than for mining.
The second theory was more difficult to discover.
Counsel for plaintiff had tried in vain to determine
what possible basis the Tax Commission had for its
discrimination. Over constant objections at the time of
trial it was found from Higgs that neither size (R. 27),
contiguity of the dump- or mills to the mine portal (R.
28), physical characteristics of the land (R. 29), type
of metal extracted or method of extraction (R. 29), were
criteria for the difference in treatment. Then Higgs (R.
29) pame forth with this novel contention: Section 8026
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5-56 providing for the flat $5.00 per acre was intended
to apply only to "mining claims," and Kennecott's dump
and mills were not located on mining claims!
After a squabble that tried the patience of the court,
(e.g., B. 37, 47) counsel for defendant finally admitted
(E. 37-8):
ME. TAYLOE: The Court propounded the
question.
THE COUET: He has been asking this question for five or six minutes here, and it seemed
clear enough to me, but we haven't had any
answer to it, so I merely used an example. I
don't accuse anybody of refusing to make an
answer, but I just gave what seemed to me a
reasonable example. I think—let's not worry
about whether it is material or immaterial at
this time, and, meanwhile, we can discuss that,
and, if it isn't controlling or material, we won't
pay any attention to it and, if you feel, for any
reason, you want to put on any evidence pertaining to it before a determination is made of this
issue we agreed to try first, why we will hear
everything you have to say about it.
ME. TAYLOE: Well, in answer to the question propounded, I will say this—and that we
object to the question and the information that
counsel desires, as being immaterial to the issues
presented here today, and immaterial to any issue
which is ultimately to be determined in this case,
and I will say this, that counsel knows of no
case in which a dump- is located on other than a
mining claim, wherein it is assessed at other
than $5 an acre; that, from information I have,
all dumps which are located on mining claims—
that is, the title is mining claim or is mining property—the property, the surface itself, is assessed
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a t tpO per acre; that the only instance that—and
we can establish this, if necessary, by testimony—
the only instance which has come to the attention
of the Commission where a dump of any is located
on other than a mining claim or mining property
is the Kennecott Copper dump outlined on Exhibit
A, and that it is the position of the Commission
that that is a criterion.
MR. BEHLE: That that is?
MR. TAYLOR: Yes.
MR. BEHLE: Or should be ?
MR, TAYLOR: Is or should be.
The witness Mr. Higgs reluctantly continued: The
manner of surface use of the land in connection with the
mining operation is not a criterion used by the Commission for determining whether or not the $5.00 flat rate
should apply. (R. 49,, 50) The Kennecott dump is the
only one in Utah receiving "special attention." (R. 50)
That dump' is no different from any other except it is
bigger because of the large operation and low ratio of
metal extraction. (R. 51). In Kennecott's case alone
the Commission directed him to use the $45.73 figure.
(R. 53, 55) He didn't otherwise know where that mystic
figure came from. (R. 56) He considered the tailings
pond and mills as a unit in the entire Kennecott mining
operation. (R. 57) He knew of no single instance where
in practice the Commission has made an attempt to
determine if a mine's dump or mill was physically
located on a mining claim, or on other ground. (R. 59)
Finally, counsel stipulated that Kennecott's dump and
these mills were not located on '' mining claims." (R, 65)
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I t was established that the precipitates from the
dump were included in the mine's net proceeds tax base.
(R. 97) Also that in applying the $5.00 flat rate to mining
operations other than the dump, no segregation has ever
been attempted on the basis of particular use or the type
of patent or location, except that residential use by
employees of a mine is treated on that additional basis
for assessment purposes, in this case company-owned
homes in Bingham or Copperton. (R. 42)
Finally, it should be noted that the decision of the
court below adverse to plaintiff was made only when he
had first been assured by all parties that this appeal
would be taken, saying: " I prefer you wouldn't abide
by this decision." (R. 115)
With this background in mind, did the lawmakers,
using the words "mines and mining claims" constantly
in the constitution and statutes, intend to so limit the
flat rate assessment figure applicable to "metalliferous
mines and mining claims" to limit dump and millsites,
the former particularly inherently essential to and integrated with the mine, to situations when these dump's
or mills happen to be located on mining claims in the
technical legal sense as distinguished from desert entries
or other types of derivative or original titles to the
particular land?
At an early date the Utah Supreme Court in discussing these words "mines and mining claims" stated
that the legislature did not mean just the excavation.
I n Nephi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. J u a b County, 33 Utah
114, 93 P. 53 (1907), the court quotes from Lindley on
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Mines wherein is reviewed and discussed the authorities
and meaning of mines and minerals and its development
from an original restriction to subterranean excavations,
to modern broader meanings. The court then says:
" Turning now to the decisions of this country, we find that the term 'mines' is not confined
to subterranean excavations or workings, nor is
the term 'minerals' confined to metalliferous
ores.''
The $5.00 flat assessment rate plus the multiple of
net proceeds is the method adopted by Utah's Constitution and statutes fairly to reflect and include for ad
valorem tax purposes the special value of the mine in
its broad sense, as distinguished from machinery, surface improvements, and property used for other than
mining purposes which can be tested for value by normal
standards. This intention is brought out by such cases
as Ontario Silver Mining Co. v. Utah County, 80 Utah
491, 15 P. (2d) 633. The opinion in the Ontario Silver
Mining case is so important to the current problems that
we take the liberty to cite from it at length:
The tax in question was assessed and levied
pursuant to article 13, section 4, of our Constitution, which reads as follows:
"All mines and mining claims, both placer
and rock in place, containing or bearing gold,
silver, copper, lead, coal or other valuable mineral deposits, after purchase thereof from the
United States, shall be taxed at the price paid
the United States therefor, unless the surface
ground, or some part thereof, of such mine or
claim, is used for other than mining purposes,
and has a separate and independent value for
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such other purposes; in which case said surface
ground, or any part thereof, so used for other
than mining purposes, * * * and all machinery
used in mining, and all property and surface
improvements upon or appurtenant to mines and
mining claims, which, have a value separate and
independent of such mines or mining claims, and
the net annual proceeds of all mines and mining
claims, shall be taxed" by the state board of
equalization. (Italics ours.)
The tax must therefore be sustained, if sustained at all, by the provisions of the section we
have just quoted.
The Attorney General and his assistants,
who appeared for defendant in this court, contend that the tax in question is legal, and that
it is based on and sustained by that portion of
the section which we have italicized and to which
we refer without repeating it here. Counsel for
the defendant further insist that the two tunnels
in question are property, that they are appurtenant to plaintiff's mine and that they "have a
value separate and independent" from its mine.
While no case precisely in point has been found,
yet both sides cite and apparently rely upon the
case of Hale v. County of Jefferson, 39 Mont.
137, 101 Pac, 973, in which case a constitutional
provision identically like ours was under consideration. In that case a ditch which was used
to convey water to a placer mine and by means
of which the placer mine was being worked was
assessed for taxation, and the owner of the mine
and the ditch brought an action to enjoin the
imposition of the tax. It was stipulated in that
case that the ditch there in question, which was
a number of miles in length, was used for the
sole purpose of conveying water to the placer
mine, and that the same had never been used
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for any other purpose, and the owner had never
derived any benefits or revenue therefrom, except
such benefits as he derived from the use of the
water in working the placer mine. It was conceded, however, that the owner of the ditch could
sell the water for beneficial uses for other purposes, and that for said purposes the ditch would
be valuable. The Supreme Court of Montana held
that the ditch there in question did not constitute
property having a value "Separate and independent" from the placer mine within the purview
of the provision which we have italicized above.
*

*

#

#

We do not wish to be understood by what we
have said that, merely because certain property
is necessary to operate the mine, for that reason
alone it may not be assessed as possessing a separate and independent value. Whether any specific property may or may not be assessed as
having a separate and independent value can be
best determined when the facts are presented
for decision. It is sufficient now to hold that the
tunnels in question are not assessable as having
a separate and independent value under our Constitution.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the
two tunnels in question are not assessable for
taxation. Any other conclusion would result in
the taxation of any shaft, tunnel, or incline in
any mine which the mine owner might permit
another mine owner to use, in order to work the
latter's mine. Moreover, we think, it was not
contemplated by the constitutional provision
aforesaid that any of the underground tunnels,
drifts, or inclines of any mine which are used in
connection with the mine, and which are necessary to successfully operate the mine, like the
32
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tunnels in question, should be taxed as separate
and independent property.
It will be noted that the assessment in the Ontario
case was made by the old Board of Equalization about
the same time that there was first assessed on plaintiff's
tailings dump lands and mill'site lands the special use
to the particular operator for its particular operations.
Perhaps here originated the $45.73 figure.
The decision of the court in the Tintic Standard
case in 1932 likewise reflects the legislative intention
to include in the special system of mine taxation on
the basis of a multiple of net proceeds, all values peculiar
and special to the particular mine. We quote from page
509 of this decision; (104 Utah 505, 106 P. 2d 163).:
# # # The machinery, plant, and buildings
were, under the Constitution and law, required
to be assessed independent of the mine or the
net proceeds thereof, at full value for purposes
of taxation, and it is presumed this was done
and the tax paid thereon. * * * The shafts are
comparable to the drain tunnel in Ontario Silver
Mining Co. v. Hixon, 49 Utah 359, 164 P. 498,
held to have no value separate and independent
of the mine, and therefore not assessable as an
improvement. A mine shaft is not in the same
class of property as machinery and surface improvements which have a separate and independent value for taxation purposes.
Finally, we quote from Mr. Justice Wolfe's opinion
(unanimous in this respect) in the 1940 case of Telonis
v. Staley, 106 P. (2d) 163, 104 Utah 505, where at .phge
172 of the Pacific Reports he says:
S3
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I agree (1) that where mining property is
involved, all the mining property to wit: mining
claims, mineral deposits, workings, machinery
used in connection therewith, and all buildings
and surface improvements upon or appurtenant
to the mines or mining claims whether on or off
the claim, and all mills, smelters, refineries or
reduction works used exclusively for the purpose
of reducing or smelting ores from a mine or
mining claim by the owner thereof} shall be assessed as real estate and as a whole, all parts being
considered as a unit for purposes of assessment,
levy, and sale.
In contrast to the above is the decision directly to
the contrary by the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1947. To this we can only suggest that that
court, concerned in other matters which were the important issues in the case, did not have before it the
same record now before this |court; and that its opinion
concerning the problems now at hand was neither
thorough, nor realistic, nor even responsive to the
record before that court. We believe that this has been
developed in the first two points of our argument in
view of the practical difficulties which arise if the $5.00
flat rate does not apply.
As to res adjudicata, we recognize that the tax
assessment on the record and for the year 1944 before
the United States Circuit Court is a dead duck.
But here is a new assessment, on the facts as they
existed at the time this new assessment was made; and
a new cause of action and a record quite different than
that before the Federal Court. This is not merely a
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relitigation before the same courts of an old cause of
action; there is no basis in this record for either res
judicata or estoppel. This is the first time this issue
has been before this court, which is the ultimate tribunal
in this respect.
Utah's Supreme Court has stated that it will reconsider its own decisions for another tax year if new
points or questions are advanced. Kennecott Copper
Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 212 P. (2d) 187.
That case involved different tax years where federal
subsidies were included in the ad valorem tax base of
the complaining mines.
And this case differs in still another aspect. Utah's
courts, having by federal recognition the preemptive
power to interpret conclusively its own statutes, are
here for the first time called upon in connection with
the problems of this specific case. The contention of
the defendant and intervenor would deny this preemptive
right, as well as the right recognized by the same court
to reconsider its own decisions when the prior result
for any number of good reasons in equity and justice
should permit of correction. As was well said in the
Sunnen case, the doctrine of res adjudicata " rests upon
considerations of economy, of judicial time and public
policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal
relations." The rule is not intended as a cross on which
to carry forever a litigant who has not had his day in
the court which has the ultimate duty of construing
Utah's statutes. (Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U . S .
591, 68 S. Ct. 115, 92 L. ed. 898.)
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V.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing we respectfully conclude:
1. The intention of Utah's legislature and the basis
of the constitutional plan for the assessment of mines
(as distinguished from utilities and other operations
referred to in the testimony of Mr. Hammond) contemplate, in the words of Mr. Justice Wolfe, the assessment
of the mme as a unit. The mine is to include "all of the
mining property, to wit: mining claims, mineral deposits,
workings, machinery used in connection therewith, and
all buildings and surface improvements upon or appurtenant to the mines or mining claims whether on or off
the claim, and all mills, smelters, refineries or reduction
works * * V In assessing such unit " a s real estate
and as a whole," the surface should be assessed at $5.00
per acre; machinery, buildings and surface improvements
which have values apart from their use in the mine, are
to be assessed according to their "value" as in the case
of any other such property; and the remaining values
pertaining to the mine operation all come under the
multiple-of-net-proceeds factor, including proceeds from
all dumps.
Such would be the simple, fair and reasonable solution in this case, avoiding the constant argument which
has occurred over the years. Millsite and especially
dump lands being so inherently and intimately connected
with and an integral part of every mine, it just does not
seem realistic that Utah's legislature, constitutional convention and electorate intended any separation such as
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is urged by the Tax Commission.
As was said by the Federal Court in 1900 (In Re
Rollins Gold & Silver Mining Co., 102 F. 985) :
* * * Mining and milling would seem to be,
taken together, one industry, having for its object
" t o obtain possession of material products in the
state in which they were fashioned by nature."
Mining, the process of extracting from the earth
the rough ore, would seem to be the first step in
the process, milling or reducing the second step,
to wit: the further separating of the materials
found together, the one from the other, and extracting from the mass the particular natural
product desired.
To further suggest that the legislature and the people of this State in 1896 intended to draw the line on a
technical distinction as to whether or not a particular
mine's mill or dump, or any part thereof, was in one case
upon a mining location, a milling location, a patented
mining claim, a patented milling claim, or perhaps on a
tunnel location or patented claim, or, in the other instance, was upon a desert entry, a townsite, a railroad
grant or a land title based upon adverse possession or
condemnation, seems just fantastic and unreal. That it
is utterly impractical is shown by the complete disregard
and non-use of any such " t e s t " by Utah's taxing authorities in more than fifty years' administration of the
mining tax laws.
2. However, if due to the unfortunate Circuit Court
decision or for any good reason, such is determined not
to be the legislative intent and requirement, then the
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assessment is still void because arbitrary and discriminatory, and because the Commission has failed to follow
the requisite legislative standard laid down by Sections
80-3-1, 80-5-1 and 80-5-56 as amended.
Measured by the legislative test of value, the dump
lands' value is nominal and that of the millsite lands
does not exceed $20.00; and to these beginning in 1948
the 40% factor must be then applied as in the case of
all other property.
3. If the Tax Commission has failed to follow legislative mandates under either of the alternatives above,
we submit that this court has both the power and duty
to grant the requested relief.
As wras said in the case of People v. St. Louis Bridge
Co.,191N.E.303:
The fact that there may be a difference of
opinion as to the value of property between the
assessing authorities and the court does not
justify interference on the part of the court.
However, wThen the evidence shows that there
has been a gross overvaluation, entirely out of
proportion to the actual value of the property,
so that it is obvious that the assessment was
made by the taxing officers unfairly, deliberately,
and willfully and in gross defiance of the rights
of the property owner, the court will interpose
in defense of the taxpayer. Pacific Hotel Co. v.
Lieb, 83 111. 602; People v. Wiggins Ferry Co.
supra. In a case of excessive overvaluation it is
not necessary that intentional fraud be shown,
but where the evidence clearly establishes that
the assessment was made either in ignorance of
the value of the property or not on a judgment
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based upon readily obtainable facts, or the property was designedly excessively valued, such conduct on the part of the taxing authorities amounts
to a constructive fraud. * * *
See also Nephi Bank v. Christensen, supra; Salt
Lake County v. Utah Copper Co., supra, certiorari denied
264 U. S. 590; Fox v. Groesbeck, 63 Utah 401, 226 P. 183;
and 51 Am. Jur. 667, § 724.
These statutory provisions are clearly for the benefit
of the taxpayer and the rule of strictissimi juris applies.
Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Erckenbrack, et al., 93 Utah
561, 74 P. (2d) 1184, 51 Am. Jur. 617, § 651-2; and
Telonis v. Staley, 104 Utah 537, 144 P. (2d) 513. Also
the recent Idaho case of Anderson's Store v. Kootenai
County, 215 P. (2d) 815.
It is respectfully submitted that there is no justification in support of the Tax Commission's persistence in
assessing at a rate of $114.40 per acre tracts of land
which are part of plaintiff's mine and the market value
of which ranges from a nominal value to a maximum
of $20.00.
C. C. PARSONS,
WM. M. McCREA,
A. D. MOFFAT,
CALVIN A. BEHLE,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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